Kant and Fichte developed the concept of a worldview as a way of reflecting on experience as a whole. But what does it mean to form a worldview? And what role did it play in the German Idealist tradition? This paper seeks to answer these questions through a detailed analysis of the form of a philosophical worldview and its historical portent, both of which remain unexplored in the literature. The dearth of attention is partially to blame on Kant’s desultory development (...) of it, as well as its place in Fichte’s understudied lectures on religion. In this paper, I first reconstruct Kant’s conception as the starting point and then trace it to Fichte who went on to evolve it further. Fichte endorses the basic conceptual shape pioneered by Kant, namely, a reflective process of positing an idea and then checking the coherence of necessary judgments relative to it. However, Fichte came to realize that its philosophical function needed expanding. Beyond recognizing the possibility for alternative worldviews, Fichte further fleshed out how worldview creation could lead to human flourishing. The common feature between both thinkers is that the formation of a worldview aims to turn philosophy into a life-orienting exercise. (shrink)

What happens when scholars come together to study Buddhist and German Idealist perspectives on mind and representation? We explore this question and reflect on methodological considerations in what is often referred to as "comparative philosophy.".

Kant’s claim that we must postulate the immortality of the soul is polarizing. While much attention has been paid to two standard arguments in its defense (one moral-psychological, the other rational), I contend that a favorite argument of Kant’s from the apogee of his critical period, namely, the teleological argument, deserves renewed attention. This paper reconstructs it and exhibits what makes it unique (though not necessarily superior) in relation to the other arguments. In particular, its form (as third-personal or descriptive, (...) beginning from observations) and related force of assent (as a subjectively universal reflective judgment) set it apart from the other arguments. My goal is to establish that any engagement with Kant’s immortality postulate must include equal consideration of the teleological argument in order to be complete. (shrink)

Kant’s accounts of the Highest Good and the moral argument for God and immortality are central features of his philosophy. But both involve lingering puzzles. In this entry, we first explore what the Highest Good is for Kant and the role it plays in a complete account of ethical life. We then focus on whether the Highest Good involves individuals only, or whether it also connects with Kant’s doctrines about the moral progress of the species. In conclusion, we look into (...) three ways of articulating the moral argument for God and immorality that take our commitment to the Highest Good as their point of departure. (shrink)

Kant uses ‘wish’ as a technical term to denote a strange species of desire. It is an instance in which someone wills an object that she simultaneously knows she cannot bring about. Or in more Kantian garb: it is an instance of the faculty of desire’s (or will’s) failing insofar as a desire (representation) cannot be the cause of the realization of its corresponding object in reality. As a result, Kant originally maintained it to be antithetical to morality, which deals (...) with ‘ought implies can’. However, Kant’s notion of wish is not static. On the contrary, I argue in this article that Kant re-evaluated the capacity to wish as (to some extent) causally efficacious and, further, of moral relevance. This re-evaluation has not been discussed in the literature, yet has been lurking in plain sight in a subtle but decisive shift evident in two versions of a footnote from the *Critique of the Power of Judgement* (KU). (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant states that ideas give us the rule for organizing experience and ideals serve as archetypes or standards against which one can measure copies. Further, he states that ideas and ideals can be practical. Understanding how precisely these concepts should function presents a challenging and understudied philosophical puzzle. I offer a reconstruction of how ideas and ideals might be practical in order to uphold, to my mind, a conceptually worthy distinction. A practical idea, I (...) argue, is best understood as a reference to the categorical imperative (and its various formulations), which guides conduct directly as a rule. A practical ideal, by contrast, I think is a substrate that serves two functions: one that (a) helps us gauge moral deficiencies and another that (b) reveals the potential for moral improvement. In response to well-grounded sceptical concerns, I argue that ideals are indirectly practical in that they ground the possibility to recognise moral states of affairs and be moral in the first place. (shrink)

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel states unequivocally that the category of “life” is a strictly logical, or pure, form of thinking. His treatment of actual life – i.e., that which empirically constitutes nature – arises first in his *Philosophy of Nature* when the logic is applied under the conditions of space and time. Nevertheless, many commentators find Hegel’s development of this category as a purely logical one especially difficult to accept. Indeed, they find this development only comprehensible as long (...) as one simultaneously assumes that Hegel breaks his promise to let the logic do the leading. However, if Hegel were to in fact allow the logical development to be led by biological analogies at this point, problems would ensue. Not only would it contradict his own speculative method, which should secure the necessity of the categories, but it would also endanger the ontological generality of the category of life itself. Beyond undermining his method and the logical integrity of the category, however, I will argue that such a reading makes the transition to the next category of “cognition” unintelligible and problematic. My aim in the first part of this paper is to argue how logical life can be read as a pure category. I then argue in the second part how my reconstruction makes the transition to cognition intelligible without resorting to profane or supernatural interpretations. (shrink)

Nos textos escritos por Foucault durante os anos 60, a problemática antropológica amparava-se, dentre outros fatores, no argumento segundo o qual a modernidade se constitui a partir de uma “finitude constituinte” a substituir um “infinito originário”. A questão do infinito teria, portanto, duas funções: a descrição da epistémê clássica e a própria comparação desta com a epistémê moderna. Entretanto, em As Palavras e as Coisas o capítulo que abre as considerações sobre o período clássico não considera, em suas linhas maiores, (...) a questão do infinito. O argumento gira em torno da “representação”. Nesse contexto, o presente artigo tenta articular as questões do “infinito” e da “representação”, considerando os escritos foucaultianos e a literatura secundária. //////////////////////// -/- En considérant les textes de Foucault écrits pendant les années 60, le problème anthropologique impliquait, parmi d’autres facteurs, l’argument selon lequel la « modernité » serait constituée par une «finitude constituante» qui a remplacée « l’infini originaire » classique. Donc, la question de l’infini aurait au moins deux fonctions: la description de sa propre fonction classique et la comparaison de cette epistémê avec l’epistémê moderne. Par contre, dans l’argumentation de “Les Mots et les Choses”, le chapitre qui ouvre les considérations relatives à la période classique ne tient pas compte, dans ses grosses lignes, de la question de l’infini. L’argument tourne autour de la question de la «représentation». Dans ce contexte, cet article essaie d’articuler les questions de l’infini» et de la «représentation», en considérant les écrits de Foucault et la littérature secondaire. //////////////////////// -/- In the philosophical texts written by Michel Foucault in the decade of 1960, the so called anthropological problem was based, among other subjects, on the argument that the modernity is composed by a “constitutive finitude” that replaced the “originary infinity” of the classical age. Therefore, the question about “infinite” has in this period two functions: the description of the classical episteme itself and its comparison with the modern episteme. However, when one consider The Order of Things (one of the more important texts on this subject), the chapter that opens the argumentation about the classical age does not focuses, in its major lines, the question about the infinite. The argument revolves around the concept of “representation”. In considering this context, this article attempts to articulate the issues of “infinity” and representation”, considering Foucault’s writings and secondary literature. (shrink)

What is the highest good actually good for in Kant’s third Critique? While there are well-worked out answers to this question in the literature that focus on the highest good’s practical importance, this paper argues that there is an important function for the highest good that has to do exclusively with contemplation. This important function becomes clear once one notices that coherent [konsequent] thinking, for Kant, was synonymous with "bündiges" thinking, and that both are connected with the highest good in (...) the third Critique’s moral proof for God’s existence. I show that the original meaning of "bündig," which is from the carpentry trade and has been forgotten, illuminates the stakes of the highest good in Kant’s system. For us, as proverbial carpenters of reason, coherence is essential for the intellectual activity of constructing a philosophical worldview in his transcendental idealism. I motivate the reading further by showing how this function can neatly reconstruct Kant’s proof for God’s existence in the third Critique. I conclude by sketching Kant’s reasons for why the project of creating a coherent worldview grounded in the highest good is worth the labor costs. (shrink)

While small group discussion is invaluable to the philosophy classroom, I think it can be improved. In this paper I present a method that I have developed to better facilitate active learning in the spirit of a philosopher within a Socratic community. My method is to form what I call a “philosophical think tank,” which takes the form of a small group that persists for the duration of the semester in order to overcome deficiencies that can arise if groups are (...) determined anew with each class meeting. After presenting the technique, I offer an overview of results, possible issues, and ideas for future development. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to clarify the role wrong plays in Hegel ’s system of right, as both a form of freedom and the transition to morality. Two approaches will be examined to explore wrong in practical philosophical terms: First, one could take the transition to be descriptive in nature. The transition describes wrong as a realized fact of the human condition that one inherits from the outset. Second, one could see it as prescriptive. Actual wrongdoing would be (...) essential for the subject’s progression to becoming moral. Though both are most likely the case, emphasis is given to the latter since it represents the actualization of potential. Furthermore, it will be suggested that wrong plays a similar role as that which alienation does in the Phenomenology of Spirit; both bridge the will as abstract personality with the moral point of view. (shrink)

This paper offers a critique of empirical tests of the free will, aiming at a presupposition underpinning the experiments’ methodology. The presupposition is that the artificial reporting of machines is prima facie directly congruent with the first-person perspectival report of the participant. A critique of the method reveals the problematic nature of this methodological set-up. The phenomenological critique, however, also carries implications for a theoretical framework dealing with ‘embodied’ religion; these implications will be dis-cussed via reference to the article by (...) Marcel Sarot. (shrink)

What function does the highest good serve in our thinking and doing? I propose a new interpretation that sees its importance as fulfilling a contemplative need to construct a worldview.

O presente trabalho pretende inserir a História da Psicologia dentro de um debate mais alargado, em torno das Histórias da Filosofia e das Ciências. Para isso, o objeto de análise é a célebre frase de Ebbinghaus, 'A Psicologia tem um longo passado, mas uma curta história', e toda a tradição de livros e textbooks decorrente dela, muito popular nos séculos XX e XXI. O trabalho analisará o texto de Ebbinghaus e seus compromissos decorrentes. Então realizará uma crítica a essa tradição, (...) em três frentes: primeiramente, trazendo à tona estudos mais recentes sobre Gustav Fechner, encarado como figura central na constituição da Psicologia como ciência, mas não obstante ignorado por seus compromissos 'especulativos'; em segundo lugar, confrontando tais questões com as perspectivas do século XX, especialmente a história epistemológica das ciências; finalmente, abrindo o 'longo passado' a uma história mais alargada, a partir de analistas mais contemporâneos que começaram a perscrutar o próprio termo 'Psicologia'. ____________________________________________________________________________________________ This paper intends to insert the History of Psychology in a wider debate along with the History of Philosophy and History of Science. In order to do that, the object of analysis is Hermann Ebbinghaus’s famous phrase, ‘Psychology has an old past, but a short history’, and all the tradition of books and textbooks due to it, very popular on the 20th and 21st centuries. The paper is going to analyse Ebbinghaus’s text and its historical commitments and consequences. Then will perform a critics of this tradition, in 3 fronts of arguments: firstly, bringing up some more recent studies on Gustav Fechner, seen as a central character on the making of Psychology as a science, but nevertheless ignored for its ‘speculative’ commitments. Secondly, the paper will confront such questions with the historical perspectives of 20th century, specially the epistemological history of science. Finally, the paper will open the argument of ‘old past’ to a more wide ‘history’, showing contemporary analysts who started to scan the historical meaning of the word ‘Psychology’. (shrink)

O presente trabalho pretende comparar o debate ocorrido entre Georges Canguilhem e Robert Pagès em Qu’est-ce que la Psychologie?, de 1956, com os escritos de Michel Foucault publicados nos anos 1950. Para isso, após alguns apontamentos históricos, faz-se uma breve análise dos textos de Foucault publicados em 1954, Maladie Mentale et Personnalité e a Introduction à Le Rêve et l’Existence. Os textos de Foucault são então confrontados com o debate entre Canguilhem e Robert Pagès, que por sua vez são analisados (...) e comparados com outros dois textos de Foucault publicados em 1957, La Psychologie de 1850 à 1950 e La Recherche Scientifique et la Psychologie. Tenta-se mostrar que o início da trajetória de Foucault não apenas dialoga com diversos temas sobre a Psicologia e as Ciências Humanas colocados por Canguilhem e Pagès, mas também ensaia respostas cujo teor será mais visível em Folie et Déraison e na Introduction à l’Anthropologie de Kant. (shrink)

RESUMO: O presente texto põe algumas questões referentes à “história” dos fundamentos da Psicologia entre os séculos XIX e XX, mostrando como ocorrem ainda, em História da Psicologia, certos fatores controversos, muitos deles tributários de postulados filosóficos do século XIX, especialmente em torno do positivismo. O artigo concentra-se em mostrar, preliminarmente, de que forma a ruptura da Filosofia Natural e a ascensão da figura do “cientista” no século XIX ensejaram novos motivos de análise, dentre eles certo cientificismo que se impôs (...) inclusive como chave de interpretação histórica. Após uma exposição inicial do problema – chamando a atenção também às consequências institucionais, da formação à profissão –, o artigo faz três breves estudos de caso – em torno de Fechner, Helmholtz e Wundt – e termina por defender perspectivas que abram a História da Psicologia a histórias mais alargadas, tais como a História da Filosofia e as Histórias das Ciências._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ABSTRACT: The present work poses several questions concerning the history of Psychological’s foundations between 19th and 20th centuries, showing how there are still today certain controversial factors derived from 19th century philosophical postulates acting on the ways of describing psychology’s history, notably around positivism. The article concentrates in showing, in a preliminary way, how the rupture of Natural Philosophy of 18th century and the rise of the figure of the scientist in the 19th century gave rise to new analytical patterns, as well as a certain Scientism that tried to impose itself as the keystone to historical interpretation. The work begins with an initial exposition of the problem – calling into attention the institutional consequences as well, from the psychological common sense to professional issues -, and then analyzes three case studies - Gustav Fechner, Hermann von Helmholtz and Wilhelm Wundt – ending with the defense of perspectives that open the History of Psychology into another historical procedures, such as History of Philosophy and History of Sciences. (shrink)

O presente trabalho enfoca as relações entre antropologia e verdade nos escritos de Foucault dos anos 1950, tendo sob alvo o lançamento recente do escrito até então inédito intitulado Binswanger et l’Analyse Existentielle. Para isso, num primeiro momento o texto contextualiza essa publicação à luz do depósito, em 2013, de novos materiais de Michel Foucault na Biblioteca Nacional da França. Depois, ele passa à análise dos textos dos anos 1950 e insere o novo texto nos demais debates. Finalmente, o artigo (...) enfoca a questão antropológica em três eixos: as relações antropologia x psicopatologia, o lugar da fenomenologia na argumentação de Foucault e os limites das considerações de Binswanger e da Daseinsanalyse. ] ] ] *** [ [ [ The present work focuses on the relationship between truth and anthropology in the Foucault's first writings from the 1950s, targeting the recent release of the (until now) unpublished writing “Binswanger et l'Analyse Existentielle”. To shed some light on such relationship, firstly the article contextualizes the new book under the recent deposit of several foucauldian writings at Bibliothèque Nationale de France, at last since 2013. Secondly, it contextualizes the place of the new book under the published texts from the 1950s. Finally, the article analyses the book considering the anthropological problem under three main issues: the relationship between anthropology and psychopathology, the place of phenomenology in Foucault's argumentation, and the limits of the Daseinsanalyse and Ludwig Binswanger’s theorisations. (shrink)

In this paper, we defend that demonstratives are expressions of joint attention. Though this idea is not exactly new in the philosophical or linguistic literature, we argue here that their proponents have not yet shown how to incorporate these observations into more traditional theories of demonstratives. Our purpose is then to attempt to fill this gap. We argue that coordinated attentional activities are better integrated into a full account of demonstratives as meta-pragmatic information. Our claim is twofold. First, we claim (...) that pragmatically presupposing salience is a fundamental aspect of using demonstratives. Secondly, we hold that the pragmatics of demonstrating can only be properly understood in relation to meta-pragmatic conditions that have to do with joint attention. We use tests of truth-value gap as evidence for our claim. Our proposal provides us with a complete view of what speakers do and presuppose when engaging in acts of demonstrative reference through language. (shrink)

O presente capítulo compõe a obra organizada por Giovana Temple, "Subjetividade no Pensamento do Século XX - uma introdução". Como tal, o capítulo sobre Foucault se reúne com outros de demais autores importantes sobre a questão da "subjetividade" no século XX. No capítulo em questão, aborda-se a questão do "sujeito", sob panorama geral, desde os escritos dos anos 50 até o fim da obra. A respeito dos textos dos anos 50, busca-se uma breve dedução de como os textos de 1954 (...) e 1957, bem como o resultado dos cursos de Foucault em Lille e na ENS, conduzem aos problemas explicitamente enunciados em História da Loucura e na Tese Complementar. Então o panorama sobre o "sujeito" explora as linhas gerais da "arqueologia" de Foucault, passando depois aos temas caros à "genealogia do poder" e, finalmente, às problemáticas do "cuidado" e das "técnicas" de si, características dos anos 80. Em suma: busca-se uma dedução da questão do "sujeito" desde os compromissos dos anos 50, explorando também suas rupturas e continuidades entre os textos dos anos 1960-1980. (shrink)

We introduce Pura Vida Neutrosophic Algebra, an algebraic structure consisting of neutrosophic numbers equipped with two binary operations namely addition and multiplication. The addition can be calculated sometimes with the function min and other times with the max function. The multiplication operation is the usual sum between numbers. Pura Vida Neutrosophic Algebra is an extension of both Tropical Algebra (also known as Min-Plus, or Min-Algebra) and Max-Plus Algebra (also known as Max-algebra). Tropical and Max-Plus algebras are algebraic structures included in (...) semirings and their operations can be used in matrices and vectors. Pura Vida Neutrosophic Algebra is included in Neutrosophic semirings and can be used in Neutrosophic matrices and vectors. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende problematizar, nos três primeiros livros filosóficos de Sartre, a noção de consciência, em torno de um duplo horizonte de interlocução: o legado “formalista” kantiano, e os diversos projetos de “ciência psicológica” existentes nos séculos XIX e XX. Para isso, recompõem-se esses dois horizontes a partir do panorama feito por Sartre desde o momento cartesiano, discutindo as diferentes filosofias da subjetividade e culminando na noção de “intencionalidade”, formulada por Husserl. A noção de consciência intencional serviria como referência (...) para julgar tanto o legado filosófico, quanto para depurar seus prejuízos, entrevistos até mesmo nos contemporâneos de Sartre. ///////////////////////////// This paper intends to discuss, in the three first philosophical books of Sartre, the concept of “conscience”, on two sorts of problems: the kantian legacy, called “formalist”, in one side, and the several projects of “psychological sciences” of XIX and XX ́s centuries. In order to do that, the text retraces the panorama made by Sartre, beginning with the cartesian moment, passing by the theme of “subjectivity”, and culminating with the notion of “intentionality”, on Husserl. The notion of intentional conscience would function as referencial, to judge the philosophical legacy, and even though to purify its defects, seen through the contemporaries of Sartre. (shrink)

Esse artigo busca oferecer um panorama de problemas relativos à existência da psicologia, a partir das questões de sua unidade, especificidade e objetividade. Para isso, analisam-se breves menções a figuras clássicas de sua história (como Wundt, Comte, Watson e Vygotsky), mostrando ambigüidades constitutivas do próprio “nascimento” da psicologia como disciplina “una” e “científica”. Ao perguntar sobre as razões da dispersão da psicologia, seu estatuto ambíguo e seu objeto “complexo”, abrimos no final o problema de que, mais do que resolver internamente (...) uma ambigüidade constituinte, é propriamente fora da ciência ou dos procedimentos ditos “tradicionais” de história da psicologia, que as condições de surgimento dessas ambigüidades – e da própria psicologia enquanto “ciência humana” – podem ser evidenciadas. Daí o apontamento conclusivo que sugere a importância de uma visita rigorosa às análises da modernidade empreendidas por Michel Foucault, para além dos portões das perspectivas históricas e epistemológicas. /////////////////// This article aims to provide a panorama of problems relating to the existence of psychology, based on issues of its unity, specificity and objectivity. To this objective, analysis is made of brief references to classic figures of its history (such as Wundt, Comte, Watson and Vygotsky), showing constituent ambiguities in the very “birth” of psychology as a “specific” and “scientific” discipline. Raising the question of why is psychology disperse, has ambiguous statutes, and is a “complex” matter, we suggest at the end (without reaching a conclusion) that, more than resolving internally a constituent ambiguity, it is really outside of science or the so-called “traditional” procedures of history of psychology, that the condition in which these ambiguities arose – and that of psychology itself as a "human science” – can be witnessed. Hence the conclusive indication that suggests the importance of a rigorous visit to the analyses of modernity undertaken by Michel Foucault, beyond the gates of the historical and epistemological perspectives. (shrink)

O texto trabalha a questão da alteridade em torno de alguns fatores históricos ligados ao "homem moderno", tomando como base escritos tais como os de Michel Foucault e os debates ocorridos desde o lançamento de Império, no início dos anos 2000. Depois descreve como esses fatores ligados à alteridade também dizem respeito às transformações ocorridas no mundo do trabalho durante as últimas décadas.

The article presents an analysis centered on the emotional lapses of artificial intelligence (AI) and the influence of these lapses on two critical aspects. Firstly, the article explores the ontological impact of emotional lapses, elucidating how they hinder AI’s capacity to develop a moral sense. The absence of a moral emotion, such as sympathy, creates a barrier for machines to grasp and ethically respond to specific situations. This raises fundamental questions about machines’ ability to act as moral agents in the (...) same manner as human beings. Additionally, the article sheds light on the practical implications within human-machine relations and their effect on human friendships. The lack of friendliness or its equivalent in interactions with machines directly impacts the quality and depth of human relations. This concerningly suggests the potential replacement or compromise of genuine interpersonal connections due to limitations in human-machine interactions. (shrink)

Quadruple Helix Collaborations (QHCs) is a cooperation model in which industry, government, academia, and the public interact to innovate. This paper analyses the impact of a training intervention to provide specific knowledge, skills, and attitudes to deal with barriers commonly found in the progress of QHCs. We designed, implemented, and evaluated three training programs in Austrian, Colombian, Danish, and Spanish institutions. We analysed trainees’ (n = 66) and trainers’ (n = 9) perceptions to identify the competencies acquired with the intervention (...) and the approach’s limitations. We used online questionnaires (35 trainees; 9 trainers), semi-structured interviews (10 trainees), and a focus group (6 trainers). Trainees answered positively regarding their self-perception about the impact of the course and highlighted the acquisition of inspiration for their practice (score 4.1 out of 5.0) and knowledge (3.7). In contrast, they perceived that a deeper interaction with other participants (2.7) was challenging. After the courses, 74% of respondents indicated that they know more about how QHCs work in practice, and 86% about collaboration or engagement methods. Moreover, participants plan to be more sensitive towards setting common goals (71%) and power imbalances (63%). Trainers’ perceptions align with those expressed by participants, except that they considered that the interaction amongst participants during the course was higher. Qualitative analysis of interviews with participants and the focus group with trainers provides more detail about the strengths and weaknesses of the intervention. Our study shows that the collaborative design and implementation of training impact the participant’s learning competencies, with potential implications in their medium- to long-term practice. (shrink)

O artigo busca trabalhar um aspecto pouco explorado da argumentação de "História da Loucura": a questão, brevemente enunciada por Foucault, de um "a priori concreto" das ciências "psi". Nisso, serão trabalhadas duas questões principais, a saber: a do estatuto do conhecimento sobre as doenças mentais como tributário de uma demanda moral (não científica), e a do estatuto do médico como "cientista" da loucura. Dentro desses dois âmbitos críticos, o Foucault que escreve seu primeiro grande livro não poupa nem mesmo o (...) lugar do psicanalista. (shrink)

O presente trabalho pretende estabelecer algumas precisões históricas e conceituas em torno da formação da história arqueológica de Michel Foucault, tendo como foco um livro póstumo e recém lançado, intitulado La Question Anthropologique (2022). Esse livro trata de um curso sobre “antropologia” ministrado por Foucault entre 1952 (ou 1951) e 1955, em Lille e na ENS. As precisões históricas e conceituais tratadas aqui são em torno dos seguintes contextos: primeiramente, analisa-se a escassa literatura de comentário anterior ao lançamento do livro (...) em 2022; depois, parte-se ao horizonte de leituras de Foucault na época, especialmente ocorridos em torno da figura de Nietzsche. Essas leituras ocorrem em diversas frentes, tais como as figuras de Heidegger e Jaspers, a importância da história das ciências, a interlocução com Althusser e Jacques Martin em torno de Marx e a questão da loucura e da psicanálise. -/- The present work aims to establish some historical and conceptual clarifications surrounding the formation of Michel Foucault’s archaeological history, considering a recently published posthumous book entitled La Question Anthropologique (2022). This book thematizes a course on “anthropology” given by Foucault between 1952 (or 1951) and 1955, in Lille and at the École Normale Supérieure. The historical and conceptual analysis concerns the following subjects: firstly, the text analyzes the scarce secondary literature published before the book’s launch in 2022; secondly, the article focuses some readings made by Foucault in those years, especially surrounding the figure of Nietzsche. These readings occur on several fronts, such as: the influence of Heidegger and Jaspers, the role of the history of sciences, the dialogue with Althusser and Jacques Martin on Marx and the themes of madness and psychoanalysis. (shrink)

O presente trabalho pretende analisar as relações entre loucura e obra no jovem Foucault, isto é, no Foucault dos anos 1950 que realiza seu curso sobre antropologia (La Question Anthropologique) em Lille e na ENS entre 1952 (ou 1951) e 1955. Para estabelecer o problema, o texto começa com uma contextualização inicial sobre os inéditos de Foucault disponibilizados desde 2013 na BNF. Então o texto constrói o problema a partir de comentadores (especiamente Jean-Baptiste Vuillerod) e encontra na figura de Karl (...) Jaspers um interlocutor importante, em torno do qual Foucault gira para estabelecer suas próprias posições. Jaspers, psiquiatra e filósofo, contém teses sobre a loucura, a obra e a civilização diretamente ligadas aos interesses do jovem Foucault. Tanto a leitura de Jaspers sobre Nietzsche, quanto a das relações entre loucura e obra, serão importantes para o jovem Foucault, pois é por meio de Jaspers - dentre outros - que uma psicologia da loucura e da obra (seja qual for seu paradigma) desemboca na análise de figuras como Maurice Blanchot, na leitura singular que Foucault faz de Nietzsche e nos problemas que o levarão a uma história da loucura. *** *** -/- This article aims to analyze the relation between madness and work (oeuvre) in the “young Foucault”, focusing on the Foucault’s lessons of Anthropology taken in Lille and at the ENS between 1952 (or 1951) and 1955, under the title La Question Anthropologique. In order to place this problem, the text begins with an initial contextualization of Foucault’s unpublished works, only made available since 2013 at Bibliothèque Nationale de France. Then the article passes to the question of the madness and work according to some commentators (especially Jean-Baptiste Vuillerod) and finds in the figure of Karl Jaspers an important author, whose reference serves for Foucault to compose his own positions. Jaspers, psychiatrist, and philosopher, contains theses on madness, work and civilization directly linked to the interests of the young Foucault. Both Jaspers’ reading of Nietzsche and considerations about madness and work will be important for the young Foucault, as it is through Jaspers (among others) that the psychological and existential positions on madness and work leads Foucault to the analysis of figures like Maurice Blanchot, to his own reading of Nietzsche and the problem of a history of madness. (shrink)

O presente trabalho pretende delinear a noção de Panpsiquismo no projeto filosófico de Gustav Theodor Fechner, especialmente a partir da análise do livro Über die Seelenfrage, de 1861. Para isso, o artigo repõe em linhas gerais a questão das relações entre seu projeto filosófico e a Psicofísica, uma vez que as interpretações clássicas sobre Fechner geralmente enxergam essas duas competências como separadas. Em segundo lugar, o artigo situa questões históricas sobre Fechner e a Psicologia (e sobre filosofia e ciência), bem (...) como a importância da Naturphilosophie em seu projeto. Finalmente, passa-se à análise dos argumentos de Fechner em defesa do Panpsiquismo e analisam-se novamente as relações entre essa visão e a Psicofísica. *** *** *** *** *** *** *** The present work analyses the concept of Panpsychism considering Gustav Theodor Fechner's philosophical project, especially fo- cusing on his 1861 book Über die Seelenfrage. To accomplish this purpose, the article firstly out- lines the links between his philosophical project and Psychophysics, considering that several classic interpretations of Fechner’s writings often considers these two subjects as separate. Secondly, the article situates some historical questions on Fechner and Psychol- ogy, as well as his perspectives on philosophy and science, and including his interpretation of Naturphilosophie. Finally, the article analyses Fechner’s arguments defending Panpsychism and looks again at the relationships between this view and Psychophysics. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Essa dissertação é resultado de um projeto maior, intitulado “Sobre a Morte do Homem e a Psicologia, em Michel Foucault”. Esse projeto busca analisar as diversas nuances argumentativas empregadas por Foucault nas críticas às “antropologias”, figuradas em seus livros ditos “arqueológicos”. Para isso, parte-se de uma dupla problematização: a autocrítica feita pelo próprio Foucault a seus escritos dos anos 50, tributários de querelas epistemológicas e de fundação da psicologia e das ciências humanas; e a descrição mesma dessas querelas, tomando como (...) base problemas históricos e epistemológicos da fundação da psicologia (no caso, questões relativas à sua unidade, especificidade e objetividade). Evidenciando a “mudança de nível” ocorrida nas pesquisas foucaultianas entre seus escritos dos anos 50 e 60 (de uma postura contestatória de certas correntes da psicologia e sugestão de alternativas fundacionistas, à denúncia das ciências humanas pelo seu modo de constituição histórica), o presente trabalho busca descrever como um todo a argumentação da primeira arqueologia foucaultiana, priorizando a descrição dos diversos níveis da crítica que História da Loucura empreende ao que se chama nesse livro de “círculo antropológico”. Dois são os enfoques principais da análise do livro: a questão do “sono psicológico”, enunciada por Foucault de passagem, mas que diz respeito ao mesmo tempo à constituição dos conhecimentos modernos e suas relações com outras formas históricas; e a questão da alteridade, realçada pelo próprio Foucault em trabalhos posteriores, cuja radicalização diz respeito não mais a uma crítica à racionalidade moderna, mas a toda racionalidade. (shrink)

When and why do we need the indexical ‘I’? Perry (1979) thinks that ‘I’ is an essential ingredient to the explanation and prediction of action. We need ‘I’ to classify the kind of belief that causes an agent to produce a new action. In his view, classifying the agent’s belief in terms of ‘I’ makes sense because, when asked to explain her behavior, the agent will be disposed to say ‘I’. Here, we argue that this dispositional assumption is problematic. The (...) disposition to act according to an essential indexical and the disposition to make a speech act that contains ‘I’ are two very different things that are not always related. The most common circumstances in which we need to say ‘I’ to explain ourselves involve other agents: when we coordinate in joint actions or when we engage in self-talk to save face before the eyes of potential witnesses. Finally, we revisit Perry’s famous messy shopper anecdote to offer a better story about why its main character is disposed to say ‘I’. (shrink)

This research was done in Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais, Brazil on february 2012, with objective was to determine which species of social wasps visiting mango fruits, their behaviors displayed by them while foraging and verify which the species of wasps visitors offer risk of accidents to farmers. The studied area was monitored during February 2012, from 8:00 to 17:00. in a 144 hour effort, and the data collected included the time of activity, diversity, aggressiveness and the general behavior of (...) social wasps around the fruits. There were registered a total of 175 individuals of 12 different species, healthy fruits were damaged during the day, and we registered the abundance and richness peaks throughout the day. This study indicated the needs for special care during the harvest, as aggressive wasps are indeed present and the abundant, resulting in a possible increase of the risk for the workers. (shrink)

A questão dos universais permanece tema na filosofia tanto na ontologia como na epistemologia. Em Husserl, há universais particulares, o ‘X’ noemático, o idêntico, e universais stricto sensu, nomes universais atemporais. Neste artigo, apresento o tema conforme analisado por Husserl em Ideias I. Na primeira seção, descrevo a trajetória até os universais destacando o paralelismo entre noese e noema. Na segunda seção, traço o reflexo para a filosofia da linguagem também afetada pela correspondência noético-noemática. Na terceira e última seção, mostro (...) como a investigação sobre os universais move-se apenas na esfera noemática, e concluo defendendo a possibilidade de partindo do ‘X’ noemático alcançar o universal em sentido estrito. (shrink)

Aristóteles, em sua obra De anima, além de apresentar uma intrigante teoria sobre intelecto (nous), que dá margem a uma compreensão bipartida do mesmo em ativo (nous poiētikos) e passivo (nous pathetikon), afirma que as afecções do intelecto são distintas das afecções de quem o possui. Uma das afecções deste que possui o intelecto, segundo o filósofo, é o raciocínio. Ademais, diz que este é perecível, ao passo que aquele é impassível e eterno. Desta maneira, longe de aclarar, acaba por (...) dif icultar não somente o entendimento do conceito de intelecto, como também o entendimento do que viria a ser a atividade racional (dianóia). Dessarte, o presente trabalho visa esclarecer os conceitos de nous e dianóia no intuito de obtermos, numa perspectiva aristotélica, um maior entendimento do nosso processo de conhecimento em geral. (shrink)

Este trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar uma perspectiva feminista da epistemologia social. A partir desta, criticar a ideia de universalização da verdade feita através do método tradicional da epistemologia analítica e das ciências, frequentemente ditas como neutras ou não corporificadas. Proponho demonstrar que o pesquisador é um corpo enquanto localização, isto é, está situado socialmente e historicamente, evidenciando suas consequência dentro da pesquisa científica. Para tanto, terei como principal escopo argumentativo as contribuições de Donna Haraway e Sandra Harding a fim (...) de articular a ideia de uma objetividade do conhecimento através de saberes que são localizados. Por fim, apontar essa perspectiva enquanto uma das ramificações essenciais para a epistemologia social. (shrink)

The shortage conditions created by the COVID-19 pandemic have been changing our ordinary way of life around the world since the beginning of 2020. Such conditions pose a challenge for shaping a cohesive theory of justice—one that takes non-ideal circumstances as necessary for the model. These conditions also interfere with agents’ moral capacity in ways that make it difficult for them to tell what is morally relevant, which impairs their ability to identify what actions are just. To shed light on (...) these problems, I turn to David Hume’s theory of justice as a test case to portray how outer conditions shape an agent’s inner conditions and affect the foundation of our moral perception of what is just. (shrink)

Ophiocordyceps is a fungal pathogen of ants of the tribe Camponotini. It is called zombie fungus, since it changes the host behavior, causing them to die in an exposed position, typically clinging onto and biting into the adaxial surface of shrub leaves. This study aimed to describe the occurrence of parasitic associations between Ophiocordyceps and ants of the genus Camponotus in an urban fragment of Atlantic Rainforest in southeastern Brazil and to measure the rate of hyperparasitism in Ophiocordyceps by other (...) fungi in the same location. We found 57 individuals of four species of ants and three species of fungus. The age categories of fungi were equally distributed, and rate of hyperparasitism was 17.5% (n = 10). The sampled area was recognized as an important site of Ophiocordyceps occurrence. (shrink)

This record describes the occurrence of conflicts between stingless bees of an active colony of Scaptotrigona bipunctata (Lepeletier) and individuals of Melipona quadrifasciata (Lepeletier), and discusses possible hypotheses that motivated the attack. Behaviors were observed in an active colony of S. bipunctata. The active nest guards detained individuals of M. quadrifasciata who invaded the colony. The chances of misidentification of the colony entrance and error in the species possible aggregation were discarded, however, the hypothesis of the real invasion recorded in (...) this study demonstrates a behavioral strategy by M. quadrifasciata suggests that there is an energy savings if successful in looting. (shrink)

Forrageamento por Recurso Alternativo em Época de Estiagem por Apis mellifera Linnaeus, 1758.

The unit root problem plays a central role in empirical applications in the time series econometric literature. However, significance tests developed under the frequentist tradition present various conceptual problems that jeopardize the power of these tests, especially for small samples. Bayesian alternatives, although having interesting interpretations and being precisely defined, experience problems due to the fact that that the hypothesis of interest in this case is sharp or precise. The Bayesian significance test used in this article, for the unit root (...) hypothesis, is based solely on the posterior density function, without the need of imposing positive probabilities to sets of zero Lebesgue measure. Furthermore, it is conducted under strict observance of the likelihood principle. It was designed mainly for testing sharp null hypotheses and it is called FBST for Full Bayesian Significance Test. (shrink)

Rosenthal descreve a consciência de criatura como o simples fato de uma criatura estar desperta e atenta aos estímulos externos da natureza. Estas criaturas conscientes possuem determinados estados mentais que representam os fenômenos da natureza, isto é, uma certa propriedade mental que estabelece uma relação entre o fenômeno da natureza, e aquilo que percebemos desse fenômeno. Estes estados mentais podem ou não estarem presentes na consciência de criatura. O que é responsável por tornar esses estados mentais conscientes? Para tentar responder (...) a essa pergunta, Rosenthal propõe uma teoria baseada em estados mentais de ordem superior. Estes estados mentais, não representam fenômenos externos, mas outros estados mentais,tornando estes últimos em estados mentais conscientes. Entretanto, Charles Siewert (1996) afirma que Rosenthal comete o mesmo erro de Brentano ao responder esse problema da consciência com o uso de estados mentais de ordem superior. Porém, não é verdade que Brentano se utiliza da ordem superior para elaborar sua teoria sobre a consciência, Brentano (1874) utiliza estados mentais internos que se autorrepresentam de determinada forma. Outros autores, como Dan Zahavi (2004), Rocco Gennaro (1996) entre outros, também estabelecem uma ligação entre Rosenthal e Brentano, alguns afirmando que suas teorias são equivalentes, outros negando. Devido a essa recorrente confusão, o objetivo do trabalho é não só uma análise das teorias dos dois autores, mas também uma comparação entre os fundamentos, as argumentações e as características de ambas as teorias. Dessa forma, pretendo ao final deste dissertação mostrar que as teorias da consciência de Rosenthal e de Brentano são profundamente diferentes. Além disso, pretendo mostrar com base tanto no funcionamento da teoria, quanto em estudos empíricos, a teoria de Rosenthal parece estar mais adequada para explicar o fenômeno da consciência. (shrink)